
















rather	 easy	 to	 identify	 a	 repeating	pattern	of	 short	 periods	 of	 cooperation	alternated	 to	much	
longer	interludes	of	brutal	repression,	the	overarching	aim	of	both	being	the	safeguarding	of	the	
regime’s	 fragile	 perceived	 legitimacy.	 It	 follows	 that	 the	 politicisation	 of	 sectarian	 hatred	 and	
strategies	 at	 the	 hand	 of	 the	 state	 has	 led	 to	 the	Muslim	 Brotherhood	 being	 constructed	 and	
perceived	as	“the	other”,	which	has	arguably	hindered	the	organization’s	political	development	



































identified	 as	 happening	 mostly	 within	 nations	 formed	 by	 various	 groups	 of	 different	 ethnic	
backgrounds	 and	 religious	 beliefs.	 However,	 this	 process	 is	 not	 exclusive	 to	 religious	 or	 ethnic	
minorities	and	can	therefore	happen	within	a	majoritarian	context	or	group	as	well,	such	as	in	the	
case	of	competing	understanding	and	usage	of	Sunni	Islam	in	Egypt.	For	the	purpose	of	this	article,	
sectarianism	will	 be	understood	as	 “any	 religious	or	 sectarian	barrier	 that	 is	based	on	 inherited	
beliefs	against	the	‘other’”,	and	as	“the	tendency	to	undermine	social	cohesion	by	pushing	for	the	
reproduction	of	ancient	beliefs	and	separations”.	 In	essence,	sectarianism	is	 formed	by	all	 those	
practices	 that	 are	 used	 to	 turn	 diversity	 into	 conflict,	 where	 notions	 of	 identity	 politicised	 and	
weaponised	to	create	divisions	between	the	“sectarian	self”	and	the	“other”	 (Kaileh	and	Shams,	
2014.	 Therefore,	 once	we	 acknowledge	 that	 sectarianism	 goes	 beyond	 religious	 difference	 and	
divisions,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 both	 the	 terms	 and	 its	 associated	 practices	 are	 intrinsically	
connected	 with	 politics,	 and	 are	 consequently	 often	 used	 as	 justifications	 for	 processes	 of	
securitisation.	 The	 notion	 of	 the	 “construction	 of	 ‘the	 other’”	 is	 key	 here,	 as	 it	 leads	 to	
manifestations	 of	 religious/political	 violence,	 dehumanisation,	 and	 scapegoating	 for	 political	
purposes,	which	 are	 all	 elements	 that	 can	 be	 easily	 identified	when	 examining	 the	 relationship	
between	the	MB	and	various	Egyptian	regimes.	In	the	particular	context	central	to	this	article,	 is	




Therefore,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 article,	 sectarian	 tensions	 in	 Egypt	 will	 be	 understood	 as	
happening	within	a	majoritarian	religious	context,	as	in	the	continuous	struggle	between	the	state	











the	 Free	 Officers	 in	 1952.	 Therefore,	 the	 regime	 had	 always	 had	 to	 rely	 on	 some	 form	 of	
institutionalised	 Islam	 in	order	 to	be	perceived	as	 legitimate,	 a	 state	of	 affairs	 that	has	made	 it	




















justify	 the	MB’s	 recurrence	 to	 violence	 as	means	 to	 its	 political	 ends	or	 the	 times	 in	which	 the	








caliph	 Umar,	 companion	 of	 the	 prophet	 Mohamed,	 meant	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Egyptians	








peak	 with	 the	 creation	 of	 the	MB	 in	 1928.	 It	 follows	 that	manifestations	 of	 sectarian	 violence	
between	the	state	and	the	MB	have	been	historically	based	on	the	debate	over	the	role	of	religion	
in	society,	and	over	which	of	these	two	actors	was	perceived	to	be	more	legitimate	to	rule	in	the	

























said	 before,	 sectarianism	 within	 the	 country	 is	 broadly	 understood	 as	Muslim	 violence	 against	






















of	 society,	 which	 rewarded	 it	 with	 an	 unprecedented	 level	 of	 domestic	 and	 regional	 support	
(Johnson,	2012).	Al	Banna		conceived	the	Brotherhood	as	a	grassroots	religious	movement	aimed	at	
the	 gradual	 Islamisation	 of	 society	 through	 the	 practices	 of	 da’wa	 (preaching)	 and	 tarbiyya	
(education),	 reason	why	 the	MB	 is	 renowned	 for	 combining	political	 activism	and	 revolutionary	
activities	with	Islamic	principles	and	social/charity	work,	while	aiming	at	constituting	an	inclusive	
society	that	is	regulated	by	the	teachings	contained	in	the	Quran	and	the	Sunnah	(El-Hudaibi,	2010).	
As	 said	before,	 the	MB	also	 successfully	 	embodied	 	 the	struggle	against	British	colonialism	and	
external	influence,	which	made	its	appeal	resonate	throughout	all	classes	of	the	Egyptian	population	
(Ayoob,	 2008,	 65).	 Overall,	 it	 was	 its	 nature	 as	 a	 socio-religious	 movement	 characterised	 by	
nationalist	goals	and	rejection	of	Western	influence	that	made	the	MB	stand	out	amongst	all	others	
religious	 organizations,	 and	 the	 gradual	 evolution	 of	 this	 original	 narrative	 to	 encompass	




























opposition	 to	 the	 Egyptian	 government	 and,	 as	 the	 country’s	 leading	 Islamist	 movement,	



































activities	 linked	 to	 the	paramilitary	 group	 led	 to	 the	dissolution	 and	outlawing	of	 the	 “mother”	
organization	 in	1948	 (Zahid,	2010,	75-77).	The	second	wave	of	 radicalization	came	 in	1954	after	
Gamal	Nasser’s	 crackdown	on	 the	organization	 and	with	 the	 emergence	of	 “Qutbism”,	 and	 can	
therefore	be	understood	as	being	defensive	rather	than	offensive.	Understanding	the	concept	of	





division	 within	 the	 organisation	 (Qutb,	 1990,	 8).	 Such	 radicalised	 narrative	 kept	 on	 fascinating	
numerous	Muslim	Brothers	 even	 after	Qutb’s	 death	 in	 1966,	 and	his	 legacy	 still	 lives	 on	 today.	






Therefore,	 because	 of	 its	 growing	 popular	 appeal	 and	 radical	 past,	 the	 MB	 soon	 came	 to	 be	
perceived	as	both	a	political	resource	and	a	potential	threat	by	the	regime,	which	initiate	long	cycles	














and	 political	 actors,	 thanks	 to	 its	 huge	 contribution	 to	 civil	 society	 and	 ability	 to	 mobilize	
unprecedented	numbers	of	people.	Its	success	meant	that	the	group	quickly	came	to	be	perceived	
as	 both	 a	 threatening	 opposition	 force	 and	 a	 potential	 powerful	 ally	 for	 the	 Egyptian	 regime,	
































and	 was	 set	 to	 transform	 the	 country	 into	 a	 Republic	 (Alexander,	 2011,	 536-537).	 Even	 if	 not	






given	 its	 fundamental	 strategic	 position	was	occupied	by	over	 50,000	British	 troops,	 a	 fact	 that	
further	 accentuated	 popular	 dissatisfaction	 (McNamara,	 2003,	 16-17).	 Domestic	 discontent	was	
rising	high	and	was	further	fuelled	by	the	Egyptian	defeat	against	Israel	in	the	1948	first	Arab-Israeli	
war	as,	 in	a	time	when	the	Palestinian	struggle	was	already	being	seen	as	that	of	the	Arabs	as	a	

























as	 the	 first	 President	 of	 Egypt,	 while	 the	 23	 August	 is	 since	 then	 celebrated	 by	 Egyptians	 as	
“Revolution	 Day”.	 After	 the	 deposition	 of	 King	 Farouk	 the	 Free	 Officers	 took	 up	 the	 task	 of	
reconstituting	 the	 government,	 founding	 the	 Revolution	 Command	 Council	 and	 nominating	
Mohamed	Naguib	as	Prime	Minister	(Elbendary,	2012).	Interestingly,	soon	after	the	coup	the	Free	
Officers	 did	 not	 seek	 to	 institute	 a	 new	government	nor	 they	 claimed	 to	have	brought	 about	 a	
Revolution,	as	they	simply	aimed	at	reforming	the	previous	system	after	the	final	removal	of	the	
monarchy	 .	 Initially	more	concerned	with	social	 justice	 rather	 than	politics,	Nasser	and	 the	Free	
Officers	 did	not	 aim	at	 directly	 ruling	 the	 country	 as	 they	 lacked	both	 a	 guiding	 ideology	 and	 a	
realizable	long-term	plan,	but	it	was	not	long	until	they	realised	that	in	order	to	keep	the	people’s	









narrative	very	similar	 to	 that	of	 the	Brotherhood,	as	 the	Free	Officer’s	 core	objectives	were	 the	
removal	of	British	colonialism,	reformation	of	the	corrupted	parliamentary	system	and	the	issuing	
of	 reforms	 to	 tackle	 the	 ever-worsening	 socio-political	 situation	 (Cook,	 2012,	 40).	 Nasser	 in	












al	Hudaybi’s	 approval,	who	also	defined	 the	military	 coup	as	 a	 “blessed	 revolution”	 (Elbendary,	
2012).	The	Officers’s	removal	of	King	Farouk	was	in	fact	considered	by	many	as	a	proxy	victory	for	
the	Islamic	Organisation,	as	they	also	made	promises	of	Islamic	reforms	and	committed	to	a	definite	
removal	 of	 foreign	 influences	 from	 Egypt,	 both	 core	 elements	 of	 the	 Brotherhood’s	 narrative	




to	 the	 Free	 Officers	 its	 re-legitimatization,	 which	 therefore	 strengthened	 the	 links	 and	 initial	


























him	 (Rubin,	 1990,	 10-13),	 therefore	 turning	Muslim	 Brotherhoods	 into	 the	 fundamentalist	 and	
dangerous	“other”	the	government	needed	at	the	time	in	order	to	regain	some	of	its	lost	legitimacy.	
Moreover,	such	event	marked	the	start	of	the	government	crackdown	against	the	Brotherhood	and	
of	 the	 long	 decades	 of	 violent	 repression,	 imprisonment,	 and	 torture	 at	 the	 damage	 of	 the	
organisation	that	the	Nasserist	era	is	famous	for.		
	
Just	 as	 we	 have	 learnt	 to	 expect	 in	 instances	 of	 minority	 religions	 sectarian	 conflicts,	 several	
thousand	 members	 of	 the	 Brotherhood	 were	 arrested,	 and	 individuals	 sympathetic	 to	 the	
organization	within	 the	military,	 the	police,	 and	other	areas	of	 Egyptian	 society	were	purged.	A	
military	tribunal	subsequently	convicted	eight	hundred	members	of	the	Brotherhood	on	charges	of	
conspiring	 to	overthrow	the	state,	and	six	of	 its	 leaders	were	executed.	With	 these	actions,	 the	
Brotherhood’s	influence	in	Egyptian	politics	was	greatly	diminished,	and	Nasser	had	temporarily	put	
an	end	to	the	debate	over	whether	Egypt	would	have	a	religious	or	secular	state	(Hibbard,	2011,	








its	members	 along	 religious	 and	political	 lines,	 and	 turned	 the	 organization	 into	 an	 “other”	 the	
Egyptian	population	should	have	been	afraid	of.	 It	 is	 interesting	to	note	that	Nasser’s	successors	
would	follow	very	similar	patterns	and	techniques	when	it	came	to	managing	relationships	with	the	









social	 reforms,	 Arab	 pride,	 modernization,	 and	 as	 the	 highest	 peak	 of	 Egypt’s	 regional	 and	
international	 influence.	However,	Nasser’s	years	were	also	marked	by	growing	authoritarianism,	
repression,	 and	 to	 the	 sectarian	 targeting	 of	 the	Muslim	 Brotherhood,	which	 led	 to	 the	 formal	
dissolution	of	the	organization	in	1954	and	to	the	imprisonment	and	detention	of	thousands	of	its	
members.	Arguably	the	discrimination	and	brutalities	to	which	the	Islamist	group	were	subjected	in	





















al-Mumen	 (the	Believer	President),	 however	 there	 are	many	who	argue	 that	 the	 creation	of	 an	


























provoked	by	Nasser’s	 commanded	economy,	and	by	doing	so	avoiding	 the	 further	worsening	of	
poverty	that	could	have	led	to	discontent.	However,	while	highly	innovative	in	some	aspects,	these	
policies	 also	 backfired	 really	 harshly	 on	 the	 government	 and	 further	 fuelled	 the	 popular	
dissatisfaction	that	was	simmering	 in	the	background.	 In	fact	the	 involvement	 in	the	Arab-Isreali	
conflict	that	gave	Sadat	domestic	and	international	resonance	in	1973	failed	him	in	the	follow-up,	
as	 the	 role	he	played	 in	 the	 stipulation	of	 the	1979	Egypt-Israel	peace	 treaty	 led	 to	widespread	











adopted	 a	 multi-party	 system	 in	 1971,	 an	 action	 that	 was	 highly	 beneficial	 not	 only	 for	 the	
Brotherhood’s	political	development	 (Hinnebush,	1981,	444).	However,	 it	needs	 to	be	reminded	
that	the	Brotherhood	openly	supported	Nasser	after	the	success	of	the	1952	Revolution,	who	just	
as	Sadat	enforced	some	degrees	of	pluralism	and	even	re-legalised	the	organisation	after	its	first	









with	 the	re-drafting	of	 the	Egyptian	constitution,	which	confirmed	the	role	of	Shari’a	 law	as	 the	
principal	 source	 of	 jurisprudence	 and	 therefore	 stressed	 the	 relevance	 of	 Islam	within	 Egyptian	
society.	This	meant	that	one	of	the	two	main	objectives	that	the	Brotherhood	was	pursuing	at	the	





























for	the	shaping	of	the	organisation’s	political	 identity	and	narrative.	Even	 if	 the	MB	did	not	 face	
violent	repression	until	after	Sadat’s	assassination,	towards	the	end	of	his	rule	the	organization	was	











during	 the	past	 30	 years.	 Regardless,	 the	Brotherhood	had	 consistently	 grown	as	 political	 actor	
during	Sadat’s	time,	slightly	diverting	from	a	uniquely	religious	narrative	and	starting	to	fully	develop	





the	 systematic	 political	 repression	 to	 which	 the	MB	 had	 alternatively	 been	 subjected	 since	 its	
inception	made	its	return	during	the	last	years	of	Sadat	rule,	undermining	the	Brotherhood’s	hopes	




	After	 his	 confirmation	 as	 President	 by	 the	 People	 Assembly	 in	 October	 1981,	 Hosni	 Mubarak	
declared	his	commitment	to	rule	accordingly	to	the	policies	set	up	by	his	predecessor	(Taha	and	
Kortam	and	El	Behairy,	2013).	He	manifested	his	intentions	of	pursuing	economic	liberalisation	by	






government	 had	 once	 again	 thrown	 the	 country	 into	 political	 repression	 and	 economic	 failure	
(Zahid,	2010,	81-83).	
	
























(Brownlee,	 2002,	 7).	 However,	 accordingly	 to	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 cycle	 that	 the	 Egyptian	
population	was	 sadly	 familiar	with,	 the	 initially	 liberal	 narrative	 of	Mubarak’s	 rule	 soon	 started	
turning	 into	 what	 would	 become	 unprecedented	 despotism.	 Solely	 the	 fact	 that	 Mubarak’s	



















despotism,	 something	 that	 despite	 the	 worsening	 circumstances	 was	 strongly	 fuelling	 the	








outlined	 earlier,	 starting	 with	 a	 short	 period	 of	 cooperation	 followed	 by	 brutal	 sectarian	
crackdowns.	 The	 very	 first	 years	 of	 Mubarak’s	 rule	 were	 characterised	 by	 some	 degree	 of	
liberalisation	 and	 political	 openness,	 in	 a	 clear	 attempt	 of	 finding	 legitimacy	 and	 gain	 popular	
support.	Mubarak	was	also	very	conscious	of	the	growing	popularity	of	the	Brotherhood	and	of	the	











Mubarak	 proceeded	 to	 release	 from	prison	 all	 the	 political	 activists	 that	 had	 been	 jailed	 under	
Sadat’s	 last	 few	 years	 in	 power,	 among	 whom	 there	 were	 numerous	 members	 of	 the	Muslim	
Brotherhood.	Mubarak	allegedly	did	so	with	 the	aim	to	seek	reconciliation	with	 Islamists	and	to	
distance	 himself	 from	 the	 authoritarian	 rule	 of	 his	 predecessor,	 just	 as	 Sadat	 had	 done	 after	
succeeding	Nasser	in	1970	(Walsh,	2003).	The	first	years	of	the	Mubarak	regime	were	characterised	
by	 a	 strong	 democratization	 and	 political	 participation	 of	 opposition	 parties,	 reason	 why	 the	
Brotherhood	was	allowed	to	participate	in	both	the	1987	and	2000	elections	despite	still	being	illegal	





its	members.	 The	 fragile	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 Brotherhood	 had	 been	
broken	once	again,	and	given	the	validity	of	the	Emergency	Law,	the	Muslim	Brothers	started	being	
periodically	subjected	to	indiscriminate	arrests	and	prolonged	detention	(Davidson,	2000,	85-87).	












recognition	of	 its	 influence,	something	that	 its	members	had	sought	 for	decades.	However,	as	a	
consequence,	Mubarak	harshened	his	iron	fist	even	more	and	the	country	fell	victim	of	uncontrolled	





had	 been	 jailed,	 with	Mubarak	 portraying	 the	 Brotherhood	 through	 sectarian	 lenses	 as	 “illegal	





















repression	of	 its	history,	with	 sectarian	discourses	driving	governmental	policies	 and	brutalities.	




























Commission,	 2014).	Moreover,	 as	 of	 late	 2014,	 an	 estimated	 42,000	people	were	 being	 held	 in	
custody,	 including	 almost	 all	 of	 the	Muslim	 Brotherhood’s	 top	 leadership	 and	 thousands	 of	 its	
members	and	supporters.		Hundreds	of	cases	of	torture,	deaths	due	to	abuse	or	lack	of	medical	care	
while	in	detention,	sexual	assault,	and	forced	disappearances	among	dissidents	affiliated	with	the	




facing	 the	 worst	 repression	 of	 its	 history	 so	 far.	 Together	 with	 being	 branded	 as	 “terrorists”,	










important	 to	notice	 that	 the	 sectarian	crackdown	on	 the	Brotherhood	does	not	come	only	with	
proofs	of	unprecedented	breaches	of	human	rights,	but	with	crippling	consequences	for	Egyptian	
civil	 society	 and	 welfare	 system.	 The	 Islamist	 organization	 has	 in	 fact	 historically	 acted	 as	 a	
fundamental	civil	society	actor,	providing	education,	job	training,	and	healthcare	to	the	millions	of	
Egyptians	 that	 are	 being	 neglected	 by	 the	 state.	 This	 harsher	 than	 ever	 crackdown	 is	 seriously	
impacting	on	the	organization’s	past	capability	to	keep	working	on	the	provision	of	social	services,	
and	therefore	risks	to	terminate	a	network	of	welfare	support	that	took	years	to	develop	and	on	



























has	been	used	as	a	political	 tool	 for	decades,	 and	has	negatively	affected	 the	way	 in	which	 the	
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